Un Yemen Stockholm Agreement
Overall, one year after its agreement, the outcome of the Stockholm agreement is very limited. In particular it has not prevented the Huthis from increasing their influence in the part of Yemen they control nor has it reduced their control in Hodeida governorate. The main positive achievement of the Stockholm agreement has been on the Hodeida front. The fighting in Hodeida has virtually ceased for almost a year, and the truce has more or less held for 13 months. This is due to the presence of the UN mission to support the hodeida agreement (UNMHA) in January 2019, whose mandate was renewed for a further six months on 13 January 2020. Although it has faced significant difficulties and is on its third leader, it is now fully occupied and has set up 4 “observation posts” in the city of Hodeida, which help to maintain the area without combat and facilitate the transit of goods between the port and roads inland. The “re-deployment of forces”, which required the redistribution of troops from both sides and the surrender of the three ports to the local security forces, agreed by both sides and approved by the United Nations, was less successful. This formulation naturally allowed each party to interpret the situation as it had intended, and that is exactly what they did. On the basis of last year, we should commend the efforts of the UN Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths, who, despite the concerted obstacles, is still working tirelessly on a breakthrough in the final peace agreement under the Stockholm Agreement, which has proved to be the black hole in the crisis in Yemen. A few weeks ago, Griffiths was uncomplicated in an interview with the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat. He said Stockholm was “just a humanitarian step to fill a gap, but not a precondition for starting the political process. It includes specific measures to build trust, strengthen the political process and not block it. I can add that the experience of confidence-building measures has been overtaken by recent events and we look forward to ending the war and starting in-depth discussions on security and policy measures within the framework of the defined mandate.
The government`s interpretation of the agreement plays a good role among advocates who view the rebels as deceptive and capable operators, who use negotiations and agreements to reposition themselves before aspiring to further military gains. [fn] The group cites as an example the 2014 Peace and National Partnership Agreement (EPA), which called for a gradual withdrawal of Houthi troops from Sanaa in exchange for a series of political concessions, including the formation of a new government.